Concept
Projectivism is a philosophical theory positing that humans project their subjective experiences, emotions, and values onto the external world, interpreting it through the lens of their own mental states. This concept challenges the notion of objective reality by suggesting that much of what we perceive as external qualities are actually internal projections.
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Concept
Subjectivity refers to how personal perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires influence one's perception and interpretation of the world. It contrasts with objectivity, which is based on unbiased and universally accepted facts, highlighting the importance of individual experience in shaping reality.
Concept
Phenomenology is a philosophical approach that emphasizes the study of conscious experience from the first-person perspective, seeking to uncover the essential structures of experiences and phenomena. It aims to bridge the gap between subjective perception and objective reality by examining how things appear to consciousness, rather than what they are in themselves.
Concept
Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that suggests moral statements do not convey objective truths but rather express the speaker's emotions or attitudes. It implies that moral disagreements are not about facts but are instead conflicts of emotional responses or preferences.
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Perception is the process by which individuals organize and interpret sensory information to give meaning to their environment. It involves complex interactions between sensory input, cognitive processes, and previous experiences, shaping how we understand and interact with the world around us.
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Constructivism is a learning theory that posits knowledge is actively constructed by learners through experiences and interactions with the world, rather than passively received from external sources. It emphasizes the importance of context, prior knowledge, and social interaction in the learning process, promoting a learner-centered approach to education.
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Moral relativism is the philosophical view that moral judgments and values are not absolute but are instead shaped by cultural, historical, or personal circumstances. It challenges the notion of universal moral truths, suggesting that what is considered right or wrong can vary significantly across different societies and contexts.
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Cognitive bias refers to systematic patterns of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment, where individuals create their own 'subjective reality' from their perception of the input. These biases often result from the brain's attempt to simplify information processing, leading to errors in decision-making and judgment.
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Interpretivism is a research paradigm that emphasizes understanding the subjective meanings and social contexts that shape human behavior, contrasting with the objectivity sought in positivism. It relies on qualitative methods to explore how individuals construct and interpret their social realities, often valuing depth of insight over generalizability.
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Expressivism is a philosophical theory in meta-ethics suggesting that moral statements do not describe states of the world but instead express the speaker's attitudes or emotions. It challenges the notion of objective moral facts, positing that moral discourse functions primarily to influence behavior and express approval or disapproval.
Concept
Quasi-realism is a philosophical position in meta-ethics, primarily associated with Simon Blackburn, which seeks to explain how our moral discourse can be meaningful and objective-like without committing to the existence of moral facts. It suggests that moral statements project our attitudes and emotions while still allowing us to talk as if they were objective truths.
Concept
Ethical Non-Cognitivism posits that moral statements do not express factual propositions or knowledge but instead express emotions, attitudes, or prescriptions. This perspective challenges the notion that moral judgments can be true or false, emphasizing their role in influencing behavior rather than conveying objective truths.
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