Concept
Mental causation refers to the philosophical problem of how mental states, like beliefs and desires, can cause physical events in the world, such as actions. This issue challenges our understanding of the mind-body relationship, particularly in light of physicalism, which posits that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical.
Relevant Degrees
Concept
The mind-body problem is a philosophical and scientific issue concerning the relationship between mental states, such as beliefs and desires, and physical states, such as brain processes. It questions how subjective experiences arise from neural activities and whether consciousness can be fully explained by physical means.
Concept
Physicalism is the philosophical position that everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties, and that the only existing substance is physical. It asserts that all phenomena, including mental states and consciousness, can be explained in terms of physical processes and laws of nature.
Concept
Epiphenomenalism is a philosophical view in the philosophy of mind that posits mental events are caused by physical events in the brain but do not themselves cause any physical events. This suggests that while mental states like beliefs and desires are real, they are merely by-products of the physical processes and have no causal efficacy on the physical world.
Concept
Functionalism is a sociological perspective that views society as a complex system whose parts work together to promote stability and social order. It emphasizes the interdependence of social institutions and their collective role in maintaining the equilibrium of the whole system.
Concept
Dualism is a philosophical concept that posits the existence of two distinct and often opposing realms, such as the mind and body or the material and immaterial. It emphasizes the separation and interaction between these realms, influencing various fields like metaphysics, theology, and psychology.
Concept
Supervenience is a philosophical concept where a set of properties A supervenes on another set of properties B if any change in A necessarily implies a change in B, but not vice versa. It is often used to describe the relationship between mental and physical states, suggesting that mental properties depend on, but are not reducible to, physical properties.
Concept
Anomalous monism is a philosophical position that reconciles the physicalist view that everything is physical with the idea that mental states cannot be strictly reduced to physical laws. It posits that while mental events are physical events, the mental cannot be fully explained by physical laws, highlighting a unique relationship between the mental and the physical.
The causal closure of the physical posits that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, implying that non-physical causes, such as mental states, do not directly influence physical events. This principle underpins much of contemporary physicalism, suggesting that the physical domain is causally self-sufficient and that explanations of physical phenomena do not require reference to non-physical entities.
Concept
Non-reductive physicalism posits that while all mental states are grounded in physical processes, they cannot be fully explained by them, maintaining that mental phenomena have their own distinct properties. This perspective seeks to bridge the gap between physicalism and the irreducibility of mental states, suggesting a layered reality where higher-level properties emerge from but are not reducible to lower-level physical states.
Concept
Emergent properties are characteristics of a system that arise from the interactions and relationships between its components, which cannot be predicted solely by examining the individual parts. These properties underscore the complexity of systems, where the whole exhibits behaviors or attributes that are not evident in the isolated components.
Concept
Philosophy of mind explores the nature of consciousness, mental states, and their relationship to the physical world, raising questions about the mind-body problem, personal identity, and the nature of thought. It challenges us to consider how subjective experiences arise from physical processes and what this means for understanding human cognition and behavior.
Concept
Cartesian dualism, formulated by René Descartes, posits that the mind and body are fundamentally distinct substances, with the mind being non-physical and the body being physical. This dualistic view raises questions about the interaction between mental and physical states, influencing debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
Concept
Property dualism is the philosophical stance that, while the world is composed of only one kind of substance, this substance possesses two distinct kinds of properties: physical and mental. This view suggests that mental states are non-physical properties of physical substances, challenging both pure physicalism and substance dualism.
Concept
Descartes' Dualism posits that the mind and body are fundamentally distinct substances, with the mind being non-physical and the body physical. This distinction underlies much of modern philosophy's approach to consciousness and the mind-body problem, suggesting that mental states are not reducible to physical states.
Concept
Philosophical Dualism is the theory that reality is fundamentally divided into two distinct entities: the physical and the non-physical, often interpreted as the mind and the body. This dualistic approach emphasizes a clear distinction between the mental and the material, influencing a wide range of debates in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind.
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